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REBELLION IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT:
ON LAWRENCE, LOFTON, AND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN
Mark Strasser*

I.

INTRODUCTION

1
In Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld Florida's ban on adoptions by "any 'homosexual'
person.",2 The decision was striking in its reasoning, emphasizing certain points as
if they had great importance and then ignoring them in the analysis of the relevant
issues. Yet the most striking aspect of the decision was that it was issued after the
United States Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,3 and it seemed almost
willful in its refusal to follow Lawrence. Basically, it is as if the Eleventh Circuit
was throwing down the gauntlet and challenging the Court to either stand by or
repudiate Lawrence.
Part II of this article examines the background of Lofton and discusses why
it is implausible to believe that prohibiting adoption by gays and lesbians would in
fact promote the interests of children and, especially, why refusing to permit the
adoption at issue in Lofton had nothing to do with promoting the best interests of
a child. Part III discusses Lawrence and how the Lofton court mischaracterized
and misapplied both equal protection and due process jurisprudence in its desire
to uphold a plainly unconstitutional statute. The article concludes by suggesting
that the U.S. Supreme Court should have heard and reversed Lofton. By denying
certiorari, 4 the Court missed a great opportunity not only to protect very
important interests but also to maintain its own credibility.

II.

LOFTON AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

In Lofton, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a Florida statute prohibiting gays and
lesbians from adopting.' The decision was especially surprising given that the
state's paramount interest-promoting the best interests of the child-would have
*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School (Columbus, Ohio).
358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 807.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
125 S.Ct. 869 (2005).
358 F.3d at 806.
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been promoted by permitting the adoption in this case.6 Best interests of the child
notwithstanding, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Florida law, making clear that
both the court and the state are willing to sacrifice the interests of children to
promote other objectives.
A.

Background

Florida law prohibits adoptions by individuals otherwise qualified if those
individuals are sexually active "homosexuals," 7 although the state does not
prohibit members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender ("LGBT")
community from being foster parents.8 The plaintiff, Steve Lofton, served as a
foster parent for several children who had tested positive for HIV at birth. 9 He
petitioned to adopt a child (John Doe) he had been foster parenting since 1991.10
When his petition was rejected," he challenged the Florida statute prohibiting his
adoption of Doe.
The absurdity of Florida's refusal to permit Lofton to adopt cannot be
appreciated until one considers some of the particulars of the case. For example,
Lofton's parenting was "exemplary"' 2 and, indeed, he had received an
Outstanding Foster Parenting award. 13 Lofton's excellent parenting skills
notwithstanding, the state was implicitly if not explicitly recommending that Doe
be removed from the home in which he had lived for almost all of his thirteen plus
years14 so that he could live with someone else. Even if a single individual or
couple was willing to adopt Doe, it is hard to imagine that it would be better for
him to be uprooted at this stage of his life from the only parents and family that he
had ever known so that he could live with strangers. 5 Yet that was what Florida
was implicitly claiming would promote the best interests of Doe, a claim that on its
face suggested that Doe's interests were not the state's foremost concern.
Apparently the state realized that it would be better for the child to remain
with Lofton, because it offered to make him the child's legal guardian.16 This
indicates that Florida did not really want Doe removed from Lofton's home,
which may be just as well, given the difficulties in placing older children in

6. See id. at 810.
7. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(3) (West 2002) ("No person eligible to adopt under this statute may
adopt if that person is a homosexual."). For a discussion of the sexual activity requirement, see infra
nn. 128-32.
8. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 823 (noting that Florida law does not prohibit gays and lesbians from being
foster parents).
9. Id. at 807.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 808.
12. Id. at 807.
13. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
14. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807 (noting that Doe was born on April 29, 1991).
15. Cf. Kari E. Hong, Parens Patri[archvl:Adoption, Eugenics and Same-Sex Couples, 40 Cal. W. L.
Rev. 1, 75 (2003) ("Florida's assertions that a child will benefit from being raised by a married couple is
rendered irrelevant in the consideration of whether Florida may remove Bert from his home of ten
years, two parents, and four siblings.").
16. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808.
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adoptive homes. 7 Yet that makes the state's policy all the more hypocritical. The

state of Florida trumpeted "the primacy of the welfare of the child' 18 while, for
reasons having nothing to do with the child's welfare,' 9 denied Doe the benefits
and permanency of adoption 2° by a parent who had cared for him since shortly
after his birth 21 and who wanted to cement his relationship with Doe. Given all of
this, it is difficult to understand how the Eleventh Circuit could even credit
Florida's claim that it had Doe's interests at heart.
B.

The Legal Right to Adopt

As an initial matter, it might be unclear why the state is given so much
deference when it comes to adoption. 22 After all, as the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized in Washington v. Glucksberg, 3 the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the right to have children. 4 Yet as the Lofton court correctly noted, "there is no
fundamental right to adopt, nor any fundamental right to be adopted."2 5 Thus, the6
fundamental interest which parents have in the care and custody of their children

does not extend to the interest that a would-be parent has in adopting a child.27 It
is a different matter once an individual has adopted a child,28 but at issue here was
whether Lofton could adopt Doe, rather than the rights and responsibilities that

would come into being once such a relationship had been legally established.
That said, however, the Lofton court may have overstated the matter when it
noted that "adoption is wholly a creature of the state, 29 and implied that there was

no liberty interest created by a foster care relationship. In Smith v. Organization
of FosterFamiliesfor Equality and Reform ("OFFER"),3° the U.S. Supreme Court

17. Cf. Lisa Carpenter, Student Author, Changing the Balance: Rhode Island's Amended
Terminationof ParentalRights Statute, 50 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 153, 201 (1996) ("A child's
chances of being adopted diminish as the child grows older.").
18. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 810.
19. See Lofion v. Sec. of the Dept. of Children & Fain. Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) ("Florida's proffered justifications for the
categorical ban here are false, do not rationally relate to the best interests of children, and are simply
pretexts for impermissible animus and prejudice against homosexuals.").
20. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 824 (noting that "foster care and guardianship have neither the
permanence nor the societal, cultural, and legal significance as does adoptive parenthood, which is the
legal equivalent of natural parenthood").
21. Id. at 807.
22. Id. at 810 (noting that "the state can make classifications for adoption purposes that would be
constitutionally suspect in many other arenas").
23. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
24. Id. at 720 (citing Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
25. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 811.
26. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("[Tihe interest of parents in the care, custody,
and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by
this Court.").
27. See Mullins v. Or., 57 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[Wlhatever claim a prospective adoptive
parent may have to a child, we are certain that it does not rise to the level of a fundamental liberty
interest.").
28. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 824 (noting that "adoptive parenthood ... is the legal equivalent of
natural parenthood").
29. Id. at 809.
30. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) [hereinafter OFFER].
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contrasted foster relationships with blood or adoptive relationships, reasoning that
the former must give way to the latter.31 Yet the Court was not thereby suggesting
that no liberty interest was implicated in foster relationships but, instead, that the
implicated liberty interest was outweighed by the relationship with the natural or
adoptive parents.
The OFFER Court noted that children in foster care were often placed there
voluntarily by the natural/adoptive parents with the understanding that the
children would be returned on a specified date or when a specified event had
occurred.3' The foster parents would then be on notice that the relationship was
to be temporary and thus would have no justified expectation of permanence. 33
Indeed, the Lofton court noted that "under Florida law neither a foster parent nor
a legal guardian could have a justifiable expectation of a permanent relationship
with his or her child free from state oversight or intervention," since "foster care is
designed to be a short-term arrangement while the state attempts to find a
permanent adoptive home." 4 Needless to say, the arrangement at issue here
could hardly be characterized as "short-term," having lasted more than thirteen
years. At the very least, the state should not have been allowed to argue that
Lofton could be precluded from adopting Doe because foster care is a short-term
arrangement, given the number of years that this "short-term" arrangement had
already involved.
C.

The Lofton Court'sAnalysis of the Best Interests of Children

The Lofton court noted that "in the adoption context, the state's overriding
interest is the best interests of the children whom it is seeking to place with
adoptive families., 35 Yet it is not as if there were numerous suitable families
competing to adopt Doe. Here, the state was refusing to permit an adoption (1)
by an exemplary parent (2) with whom the thirteen-year-old had lived since
shortly after his birth (3) when there was no evidence of anyone else even
expressing an interest in adopting the child.
Indeed, it is precisely because there was no other competing prospective
adoptive family that the court's analysis rings so hollow. The court made clear
that the paramount concern was the child's rather than the would-be parent's
interest-"the state's overriding interest is not providing individuals the
opportunity to become parents, but rather identifying those individuals whom it
deems most capable of parenting adoptive, children and providing them with a
secure family environment. 3 6 Yet in the case at issue, the child had grown up in a

31. Id. at 846.
32. Id. at 825.
33. Mark Strasser, Adoption, Best Interests,and the Constitution:On Rational Basis Scrutiny and the
Avoidance of Absurd Results, 5 J.L. & Fan. Stud. 297, 302 (2003).
34. 358 F.3d at 814.
35. Id. at 810.
36. Id. at 811.
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secure family environment for nearly all of his life and the state was refusing to
give legal recognition to that family.
To support its analysis of the liberty interests implicated in foster family
relationships, the Lofton court cited several cases that allegedly supported its
position. For example, the court discussed Drummond v. Fulton County
Departmentof Family and Children'sServices," in which the Fifth Circuit upheld a

lower court's refusal to permit white foster parents to adopt a mixed-race child
whom they had parented for two years.38 Yet the Lofton court failed to mention
several important differences between what was at issue in Drummond and what
was at issue in Lofton. For example, while two years of foster parenting is
certainly a significant amount of time, Lofton involved a relationship that had
lasted more than six times that long. Further, in Drummond, there was another
couple seeking to adopt the child 39 and the lower court was deciding which couple
would promote the best interests of the child. In contrast, no other couple was
seeking to adopt the child in Lofton, and the state and the court were implicitly
suggesting that it would be better for the child not to be adopted at all than to be
adopted by the individual whose parenting had been exemplary for the past
thirteen years. Finally, the Drummond court made clear that it was permissible to
consider race not as an "automatic" factor but as one among many.4° In contrast,
one factor was an automatic bar to adoption in Lofton, and the individual barred
was someone whom the court and the state admitted was an exemplary parent.
The Lofton court also mentioned Mullins v. Oregon,4' in which the Ninth
Circuit rejected the claim that a biological grandparent has a protected liberty
interest in adopting her grandchildren. 2 Yet the grandparents in that case did not
have a parent-child relationship with those children, much less one of over
thirteen years duration.43 If a biological parent having no relationship with his
child does not have a protected liberty interest in that relationship, 44 one certainly
would not expect a grandparent to have a more privileged position. This merely
underscores the importance of having an established relationship with the child,
which Lofton clearly had.

37. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
38. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 813 (discussing Drummond, 563 F.2d 1200).
39. Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205 ("But can race be taken into account, perhaps decisively if it is the
factor which tips the balance between two potential families, where it is not used automatically?").
40. Id. at 1204-05.
41. 57 F.3d 789 (1995) (cited in Lofton, 358 F.3d at 814).
42. The grandmother's husband was the children's step-grandfather. Id. at 791.
43. Id. ("[B]y their own admission, the Mullinses never have had more than minimal contact with
their grandchildren, seeing them only occasionally and even then only for a few hours at a time").
44. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983):
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he
may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make unicuely valuable
contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will
not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests
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In Procopio v. Johnson,45 the Seventh Circuit upheld a decision to return a6
child to her biological parents over the objections of the child's foster parents.
While one might disagree with the decision to return the child to her biological
parents given the circumstances, 47 Procopio is not particularly relevant in a
context in which the foster and biological parents are not competing and, indeed,
no suitable parent was competing to adopt the child in Lofton.
The Lofton court suggested that Florida "has a legitimate interest in
encouraging a stable and nurturing environment for the education and
socialization of its adopted children, '" citing the Supreme Court's decision in
Palmore v. Sidot 49 for support. Yet Palmore provides support for Lofton's
position rather than the state's, as is clear when one considers the facts of the case.
Linda Sidoti Palmore and Anthony Sidoti divorced, and Linda was awarded
custody of their daughter, Melanie. ° About a year and a half later, Anthony filed
for a modification of custody because Linda was cohabiting with someone of a
different race whom she subsequently married. 5 The Florida court hearing the
case concluded that Melanie's best interests would be served were she to live with
her father.52
The Palmore Court noted approvingly that the trial court had recognized
that the child's welfare was the controlling factor.53 However, the Supreme Court
explained that the trial court "was entirely candid and made no effort to place its
holding on any ground other than race,"54 at least in the sense that the court took
into account what it perceived would be the likely result if Melanie were to
continue living with her mother and her mother's new husband. The Florida
Supreme Court believed that:
[D]espite the strides that have been made in bettering relations between the races in
this country, it is inevitable that Melanie will, if allowed to remain in her present
situation and attains school age and thus more vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer
from the social stigmatization that is sure to come.
Thus, the Florida court suggested that individuals (or their children) who did not
approve of the mother's choice of a mate might manifest their disapproval in ways
that would adversely affect Melanie, e.g., by teasing her about her mother's
husband.

45. 994 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1993) (cited in Lofton, 358 F.3d at 814).
46. Id. at 333.
47. For example, the parents saw the child rather infrequently, see id. at 327 n. 2, and two of the
mother's other children had been taken into protective custody after she had been charged with
abandoning them. Id. at 327.
48. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819.

49. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
50. Id. at 430.
51. The Sidotis were divorced in May of 1980 and Anthony Sidoti filed for a modification of custody
in September 1981. Id. at 430.

52. Id. at 431.
53. See id. at 432.
54. Palmore,466 U.S. at 432.
55. Id. at 431 (emphasis omitted).
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The Palmore Court agreed that the state "has a duty of the highest order to
56
protect the interests of minor children, particularly those of tender years.
Further, the Court believed that Melanie might well be subjected to certain
pressures if she resided with her mother to which she would not be subjected if she
resided with her father, since it "would ignore reality to suggest that racial and
ethnic prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have
been eliminated."57 Recognizing the "risk that a child living with a stepparent of a
different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present if
the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin, 58 the Court
understood that, all else being equal, it might be better for Melanie to live in an
environment free of these pressures and stresses.
While agreeing with the lower court's analysis of what would promote
Melanie's best interests, the Palmore Court did not therefore say that Melanie
should live with her father rather than her mother. Rather, the Court suggested
that "the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are
[not] permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from the custody of
its natural mother. ' 59 Thus, the Court was unwilling to permit the irrational
prejudices of others to come between a mother and her child.
The Palmore Court stated that the "Constitution cannot control such
prejudices but neither can it tolerate them."6 When suggesting that such attitudes
could not be tolerated, the Court was not saying that people could be punished for
having such views. On the contrary, the Court suggested that such biases were
"outside the reach of the law.",6' That said, however, the Court clearly stated that
the "law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect,, 62 i.e., the state could not
allow these possible biases to enter into a calculation of which parent's custody of
Melanie would promote her best interests. The Court refused to permit an
analogue of the "heckler's veto" in the modification of custody context. 63
Palmore suggests that the best interests test should be understood in a
particular way, namely, free from private biases. Yet Lofton involved biases
which are even less closely related to the welfare of children than did Palmore,
since Doe's best interests would have been promoted by remaining with the64
individual, Lofton, who had parented him for the first thirteen years of his life.

56. Id. at 433.
57. Id.
5& Id.
59. Palmore,466 U.S. at 433.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Alafair S.R. Burke, A Few Straight Men: Homosexuals in the Military and Equal Protection,
6 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 109, 116 (1994) (discussing Palmore as an analogue of heckler's veto
jurisprudence); Vincent J. Samar, Autonomy, Gay Rights and Human Self-Fulfillment: An Argument
for Modified Liberalism in Public Education, 10 Win. & Mary J. Women & L. 137, 191 (2004) (offering
a kind of heckler's veto analysis of Palmore).
64. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808 ("[I]n light of the length of Doe's stay in Lofton's household[,] DCF
offered Lofton the compromise of becoming Doe's legal guardian.").
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Thus, at issue here was not the claim that Doe would have been better off living65
elsewhere, for example, because he would be teased if he lived with Lofton.
Rather, what was at issue here was whether the adoption would be permitted,
given that it would promote Doe's best interests by remaining with Lofton. Because
of motivations having nothing to do with the best interests of children,66 the
Lofton court upheld a statute which undermined Doe's best interests.
The Lofton court claimed: "Because of the primacy of the welfare of the
child, the state can make classifications for adoption purposes that would be
constitutionally suspect in many other arenas." 67
Yet here, the state's
classification undermined rather than promoted the welfare of the child at issue, so
it was especially difficult to understand why the policy passed muster. Thus, not
only was the classification itself one which likely did not pass constitutional
muster, 68 but even deferential rational basis review would suggest that the
classification at issue was not rationally related to the goal articulated by the state.
III.

LA WRENCE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE FLORIDA ADOPTION STATUTE

One of the remarkable aspects of Lofton was its treatment of Lawrence v.
Texas. The tone of the Lofton decision was that of an appellate court rebuking a
lower court rather than that of a lower court attempting in good faith to
implement the law as made clear by the U.S. Supreme Court. For that reason
among others, the Lofton decision almost demands review.
A.

Lawrence v. Texas

In Lawrence, the Court struck down Texas's same-sex sodomy ban on due
process grounds. 69 The Court suggested that "there are other spheres of our lives
and existence ... where the State should not be a dominant presence."70 Within
that protected sphere are "freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct, 71 including the conduct at issue before the Lawrence Court.
The Lawrence Court understood that Bowers v. Hardwick72 had held that the
Due Process Clause does not protect the right to engage in same-sex relations.73
While the Court might nonetheless have struck down the Texas statute on equal
protection grounds,74 the Court instead wrote, "Bowers was not correct when it

65. This was rejected as a possible basis for denying homosexuals the right to adopt in State
Departmentof Health and RehabilitativeServices v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1220 n. 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. App.
1993), rev'd on other grounds, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
66. Supra n. 19 and accompanying text.
67. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 810.
68. See infra pt. Ill(C).
69. Id. at 578.
70. Id. at 562.
71. Id.
72. 478 U.S. 186.
73. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
74. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Texas statute
violates equal protection rather than due process guarantees).
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was decided, and it is not correct today., 75 Certainly, one might understand how
the Bowers holding was vitiated by subsequent cases, e.g., Planned Parenthoodof
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey76 and Romer v. Evans,77 and in fact the
Lawrence Court said as much.78 Yet the Lawrence Court was making a stronger
claim when suggesting that Bowers was incorrectly decided, namely, that a
different result should have been reached given the then-existing precedent.
To help explain why Bowers was incorrectly decided, the Lawrence Court
started out by noting that there "are broad statements of the substantive reach of
the liberty under the Due Process Clause in earlier cases. ' 79 The Court mentioned
two early cases in particular-Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary8° and Meyer v. Nebraska.81 While the Court did not discuss Pierce
and Meyer but instead began its analysis with Griswold v. Connecticut,82 it is worth
noting that both Pierce and Meyer have been described as protecting fundamental
interests. For example, in Glucksberg, the Court noted that the Due Process
Clause "provides heightened protection against government interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests,, 83 and then explained that "the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[] .. . to
direct the education and upbringing of one's children," 84 citing Meyer and Pierce
85
for support.
While the importance of the interests implicated in Meyer and Pierce is
firmly established, one reading the opinions themselves would not infer that those
interests are particularly significant. In Pierce,the Court did not describe the right
to direct one's child's education as fundamental. 86 Rather, the Court merely noted
that "the Act of 1922 [requiring children between certain ages to attend public
school] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control," 87 and then further
explained that "rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by
legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the state." 88 By the same token, the Meyer Court struck down a
law prohibiting the teaching of German to pupils who had not yet passed the
eighth grade. 89 The Meyer Court did not talk about a fundamental right to direct
75.

Id. at 578 (majority).

76. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
77. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
78. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 ("The foundations of Bowers have sustained serious erosion from
our recent decisions in Casey and Romer.").
79. Id. at 564.

80.
81.
82.
83.

268
262
381
521

U.S. 510 (1925).
U.S. 390 (1923).
U.S. 479 (1965).
U.S. at 720.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
See generally 268 U.S. 510.
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535.
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
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the education of one's children 9° but merely suggested that "this liberty may not
be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative
action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the state to effect." 91 Both of these decisions used language
which might now be associated with rational basis review-the laws were arbitrary
or lacking a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose-and yet both
decisions are cited for the proposition that parents have a fundamental interest
implicated in matters related to the raising of their children.
The Lawrence Court described Griswold as "the most pertinent beginning
point '92 for its analysis of which liberties were protected by the Due Process
Clause, so a brief analysis of Griswold is in order. The Griswold Court suggested
that the case before it "concern[ed] a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." 93 Indeed, the Court
eloquently described marriage as:
[A] coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects .. .[which is] for as noble a

purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.94
The Court thus made clear that marriage was protected by the Constitution, its
not being expressly mentioned anywhere in the Constitution notwithstanding. 95
One difficulty with this analysis, however, is that while the Griswold Court
was offering an idealistic and romanticized view of marriage, Connecticut law was
not addressing marriage as such. 96 Thus, Griswold was not about whether
particular individuals could marry or even whether individuals who had married
would have their marriages recognized in other jurisdictions but, rather, whether 97a
Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives was constitutional.
Acknowledgment of the importance of marriage notwithstanding, the Court does
not suggest anywhere in the opinion that the right to use contraception is
fundamental.
In the next case discussed by the Lawrence Court, Eisenstadt v. Baird,98 the

Supreme Court held that Massachusetts could not prohibit unmarried individuals

90. The Meyer Court did suggest that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected," id. at 401, but nowhere did it state that the right to learn German or perhaps to have one's
child learn German, was among them. Instead, the Court merely stated that "the statute as applied is
arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state." Id. at 403.
91. Id. at 399-400.
92. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
93. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
94. Id. at 486.
95. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980) ("[T]he 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes not only the freedoms explicitly mentioned in the Bill
of Rights, but also a freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life.").
96. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
97. See id.
98. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (cited in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565-66).
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from having access to contraception. The Court did not say that individuals have
a fundamental right to have access to contraception but, instead, that the
Massachusetts law violated the Equal Protection Clause.99 Indeed, rather than
affirm the First Circuit's holding that there is a fundamental right to have access to
contraception, 1°° the Court refused to address that issue, instead saying, "We need
not and do not, however, decide that important question in this case because,
whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights
must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike."1' ' The Eisenstadt
Court noted that it did not need to analyze whether the purpose behind the
Massachusetts statute was "necessary to the achievement of a compelling state
interest ... because the law fails to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection

standard."' 2 By striking down the statute using a less demanding form of review,
the Court did not thereby establish that the right to access contraception was not
fundamental-that issue the Court expressly refused to decide-but merely that
the justification for the statute was sufficiently implausible that it could not
withstand even more deferential review.
After discussing Eisenstadt,the Lawrence Court addressed Roe v. Wade °3
and Carey v. Population Services International.'°4 In Lawrence, the Court

explained that Roe "recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental
decisions affecting her destiny"'0 5 and Carey struck down a law "forbidding sale or6
distribution of contraceptive devices to persons under 16 years of age."'
Needless to say, it would indeed have been very difficult to establish that abortion
rights were deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition at the time Roe was
decided,' 7 or that the right of minors to have access to contraception
was deeply
8
rooted in our history and tradition at the time Carey was decided.'
After analyzing all these cases, the Lawrence Court addressed Bowers,
explaining why it had been incorrectly decided at the time.' °9 The point here is not
to dispute that the rights and interests in these cases fall within the right to privacy
and are fundamental, but merely to point out that the Court often did not describe
them as fundamental in the very decisions in which they were found .to be
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. One would have inferred otherwise
from reading the Lofton decision.

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 453.
See id. at 452-53 (describing the First Circuit's holding).
Id. at 453.
Id. at 447 n. 7 (emphasis in original).

103. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (cited in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565).
104. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (cited in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566).
105. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
106. ld. at 566.
107. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. Eisenstadt had been decided a mere five years before Carey, and Griswold had been decided a
mere seven years before Eisenstadt. Prior to Griswold, states could prevent married couples from
having access to contraception and could prevent minors from having such access too.
109. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565-74.
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The Lofton court recognized that Lawrence held that "substantive due
process does not permit a state to impose a criminal prohibition on private
consensual homosexual conduct."11 ° However, the court also noted that the
Lawrence Court did not characterize this right as "fundamental,"'' and was
unwilling to read Lawrence as involving anything more than rational basis review.
Indeed, the Lofton court was "particularly hesitant to infer a new fundamental
liberty interest from an opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent
with standard fundamental-rights analysis.""' 2
To establish that Lawrence was inconsistent with standard fundamentalrights analysis, the Lofton court noted that:
[T]he Lawrence opinion contains virtually no inquiry into the question of whether
the petitioner's asserted right is one of "those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and implicit in
the concept of ordered
liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
'' 3
they were sacrificed." 1
Certainly, the Eleventh Circuit's observation in Lofton is accurate-the Lawrence
Court did not attempt to establish that same-sex sodomy was a liberty deeply
rooted in the Nation's history and tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. Yet the Lofton court failed to note that other interests recognized by the
Court as fundamental also could not meet that test. For example, the rights to
contraception, abortion, or even the right to marry someone of another race..4 also
would fail to meet that test." 5 Thus, even bracketing Lawrence, the test
articulated by the Lofton court simply is not the correct test, at least insofar as one
wishes to provide a test which will pick out those interests which have been
recognized as fundamental by the Supreme Court.
The Lofton court's claim that fundamental rights must be deeply rooted in
the Nation's history and traditions is especially surprising because Lawrence
rejected that such a test should be used to determine which interests were
fundamental. In Lawrence, the Court expressly noted that "times can blind us to
certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and
proper in fact serve only to oppress,"" 6 and seemed to invite challenges to laws
that once would have been thought clearly constitutional when it said, "As the

110. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 815.
111. Id. at 816.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21).
114. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-48 ("Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and
interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century.").
115. See Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery, and Same-Sex Marriage: On Legal Analysis and
FundamentalInterests, 8 UCLA Women's L.J. 313, 319 (1998) ("[A]pplication of these criteria would
suggest that no fundamental interests would be implicated if laws were passed prohibiting
contraception, abortion, or interracial marriage, Supreme Court rulings to the contrary
notwithstanding.").
116. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
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Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
'
own search for greater freedom."117
When analyzing substantive due process guarantees in light of the insights of
later generations, the Lawrence Court rejected the history and traditions test to
which the Lofton court referred and instead embraced a kind of contemporaneous
understanding model of substantive due process. 18 A Court accepting that
individuals in each generation can invoke the principles of the Constitution in the
search for greater freedom" 9 and that liberties may be constitutionally protected
once later generations understand that laws prohibiting the exercise of such
liberties serve only to oppress 2 ° is of course rejecting that the content of the
substantive due process guarantees is determined by that which has historically
and traditionally been protected.' 2
For the Lofton court, the most significant reason to reject that same-sex
relations implicate a fundamental interest:
[I]s the fact that the Lawrence Court never applied strict scrutiny, the proper
standard when fundamental rights are implicated, but instead invalidated the Texas
statute on rational-basis grounds, holding that it "furthers no legitimate state
interests which
can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
122
individual."
Yet there are several reasons that the Lofton analysis is unpersuasive, especially in
light of the very cases cited in Lawrence in which numerous interests, now
considered fundamental, were held constitutionally protected without the Court
employing strict scrutiny. 12 3 The Lawrence analysis mirrors the kinds of analyses
offered in Pierce and Meyer-basically, the Court suggested in all of these cases
that the state's legitimate interests did not justify the intrusion imposed by the
statute. 124 Further, as illustrated by Eisenstadt,the Lofton court's analysis is faulty
for yet another reason-simply because a statute fails to pass muster when a lesser
level of scrutiny is employed does not establish that the interest at issue is not
fundamental.'25
When analyzing whether the liberty protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the liberty to engage in adult, consensual, same-sex
relations, the Lawrence Court noted: "When sexuality finds overt expression in

117. Id.
118. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1937 (2004) (noting that "Lawrence ... looks beyond the American
historical experience for insight both contemporary and cross-cultural").
119. See id. at 1944.
120. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
121. See Constitutional Law-Substantive Due Process-Eleventh Circuit Upholds Florida Statute
Barring Gays from Adopting.-Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family
Services, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2791, 2794 (2004) ("The Lofton court mistakenly refused to recognize the
alteration in substantive due process analysis wrought by the Supreme Court in Lawrence.").
122. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560).
123. See supra nn. 80-91 and accompanying text.
124. See supra nn. 86-90 and accompanying text.
125. See supra n. 93 and accompanying text.
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intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.' ' 2 6 The Court's
explanation that the Constitution protects "this choice" is ambiguous in that the
choice might refer to the choice to engage in intimate conduct or, instead, the
choice to enter into a personal bond that is more enduring. Lawrence has
implications for the constitutionality of the Florida adoption statute no matter
what interpretation is adopted, although the Lofton court seemed to ignore those
implications almost willfully.
B.

The FloridaAdoption Statute121

When first considering the constitutionality of the Florida statute, it might
not be apparent why Lawrence is even implicated. However, that becomes
exceedingly clear when the content of the statute is examined, since the Florida
statute makes sexual relations a central focus of concern.
The Lofton court explained that the Florida statute prohibiting "adoption by
any 'homosexual' person"' 28 was "limited to applicants who are known to engage
in current, voluntary homosexual activity., 129 This qualification was thought to be
important because it drew "a distinction between homosexual orientation and
homosexual activity,"' 30 and only imposed a burden on the latter. Thus, the
statute was not designed to prevent those with a same-sex orientation from
adopting,13' but only those who had voluntarily engaged in same-sex relations
32
during the past year.1 .
The Lofton court understood that Lawrence might pose difficulties for the
Florida statute, explaining that "[l]aws that burden the exercise of a fundamental
right require strict scrutiny and are sustained only if narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest. 1 33 As illustrated above,134 the Lofton court then
gave short shrift to the Lawrence analysis and holding, concluding that it was a
"strained and ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to announce
a new fundamental right. 1 35 Yet the Lawrence Court had grouped consensual
adult relations with other liberties such as raising one's children and having access
126. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
127. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(3) (West 2002).
128. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 806-07.
129. Id. at 807 (citing Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1215).
130. Id.
131. See Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1291 (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)
("Under Florida law, for example, single persons who are homosexuals but 'not practicing' may
adopt.")
132. A separate question involves what evidence must be presented to establish that the would-be
adoptive parent had indeed voluntarily engaged in sexual relations during the past year. The court did
not expressly state what disqualified Lofton from adopting. However, it did mention that he was
cohabiting with a same-sex partner and that "his application was rejected pursuant to the homosexual
adoption provision." Id. at 808.
133. Id. at 815 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978)).
134. See supra nn. 110-22 and accompanying text.
135. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817.
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to contraception and abortion. If the Lofton court had considered what the Court
had both said and implied in Lawrence, it would not have so cavalierly dismissed
the constitutional protections afforded to same-sex sodomy.
Perhaps conscious of the speciousness of its own arguments, the Lofton court
tried to show why the statute should be upheld even if the proffered analysis of
Lawrence was in error. The Lofton court stated that the "Court itself stressed the
limited factual situation it was addressing in Lawrence: 'The present case does not
involve minors.... It does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter,", 1 36 and
then the court noted:
Here, the involved actors are not only consenting adults, but minors as well. The
relevant state action is not criminal prohibition, but grant of a statutory privilege.
And the asserted liberty interest is not the negative right to engage in private
conduct without facing criminal sanctions, but the affirmative right to receive official
and public recognition. Hence, we conclude that the Lawrence decision cannot be
extrapolated to create a right to adopt for homosexual persons.137
This analysis only compounds the errors in Lofton because the Lawrence
limitations had nothing to do with the purposes for which the Lofton court wanted
to use them. First, it is important to understand what the Lawrence Court was
doing when it offered these limitations. Basically, the Court suggested that the
right to engage in adult consensual relations does not entail a right to have sexual
relations with minors, and that the right to engage in sexual relations with a samesex partner without state interference does not entail a right to marry a same-sex
partner. 38 Yet to say that Lawrence does not stand for the proposition that the
Federal Constitution protects the right to have sexual relations with minors is not
to say, for example, that those with a same-sex orientation can be precluded from
having any contact with minors or, for that matter, adopting. By the same token,
to say that Lawrence does not stand for the proposition that same-sex couples can
marry is not to say that those with a same-sex orientation can be precluded from
being accorded any statutory privileges, e.g., denied a driver's license or, for that
matter, the privilege to adopt.
It is of course true that Lawrence does not address whether members of the
LGBT community can adopt. Nonetheless, Lawrence is relevant, especially when
one considers the content of Florida's adoption ban. Gay and lesbian would-be
parents are not seeking "special treatment," e.g., the right to adopt when other
would-be parents do not have such a right. On the contrary, gay and lesbian
would-be parents are merely seeking to be treated equally so that they, too, will be

136. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).

137. Id.
138. While the Court is correct that the right to engage in sexual relations does not entail a right to
marry, that does not end the inquiry. The right to privacy jurisprudence privileges marital over nonmarital relations and will have to be substantially altered if the right to marry a same-sex partner is not
held protected by the Federal Constitution. See generally Mark Strasser, Lawrence and Same-Sex
Marriage Bans: On Constitutional Interpretation and Sophistical Rhetoric, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 1003
(2004).
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considered potential adoptive parents. It thus is important to consider the Lofton
court's equal protection analysis, because one of the prongs of the challenge to
Florida's adoption prohibition is that it offends the guarantees offered by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C.

Lawrence and Equal Protection

The Lofton court began its analysis by noting that same-sex orientation is
not a suspect classification13 9 and then explained that the Florida statute would be
140
examined with rational basis review, which is "a paradigm of judicial restraint.,
The court argued that "[u]nder this deferential standard, a legislative classification
'is accorded a strong presumption of validity' and 'must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably 14conceivable
state of facts that could
1
provide a rational basis for the classification.'
Yet this seems to be at best an incomplete picture of rational basis review.
As Justice O'Connor's concurrence stated in Lawrence:
[S]ome objectives, such as 'a bare ...desire to harm a politically unpopular
group,' are not legitimate state interests. When a law exhibits such a desire
to harm a politically unpopular group, . . . [the Court has] applied a more
searching form of rational142basis review to strike down such laws under the
Equal Protection Clause.'
Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, even rational basis review is not as
straightforward as the Lofton court would have one believe.
As support for• her
claim that the Court sometimes employs heightened
141
rational basis review,
Justice O'Connor cited City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.'44 The Lofton court apparently did not understand her point,
since it read Cleburne as "reassert[ing] the unremarkable principle that, when a
statute imposes a classification on a particular group, its failure to impose the
same classification on 'other groups similarly situated in relevant respects' can be
probative of a lack of a rational basis., 145 Yet there are a number of reasons that
this does not capture Cleburne.
At issue in Cleburne was the denial of a special use permit which would
allow the operation of a group home for the mentally handicapped.1 46 In
Cleburne, the Court expressly rejected that "mental retardation [is] a quasisuspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is

139.
140.
141.
142.

Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818.
Id. (citing FCC v. Beach Commun., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993)).
Id. at 818 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).

143.

See id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985)).

Justice O'Connor also cited Romer and United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973). See id.
144. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
145. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 821 (quoting Bd of Trustees. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,531 U.S. 356, 366
n. 4 (2001)).

146. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436.
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normally accorded economic and social legislation.' ' 147 Thus, the Cleburne Court
acknowledged that it was using the rational basis test and, further, that the
"general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest."1' 8 Yet the Court nonetheless struck down the ordinance as applied, 49
which puts into question when a statute will be found rationally related to a
legitimate state interest or, perhaps, what must be shown to defeat the
presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes that are being examined in
light of the rational basis test.
The Cleburne Court understood that there were "real and undeniable
differences between the retarded and others"'5 and, further, that "the mentally
retarded as a group are indeed different from others not sharing their misfortune,
and in this respect they may be different from those who would occupy other
facilities that would be permitted in an R-3 zone without a special permit."'' The
Court then remarked that "this difference is largely irrelevant unless the
Featherston home and those who would occupy it would threaten legitimate
interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses such as boarding houses and
hospitals would not.' ' 152 Yet to say that a difference is largely irrelevant is not to
say that it is completely irrelevant. Insofar as the difference is somewhat relevant,
one would expect a court using the rational basis test to defer to the state with
respect to which zoning regulations were appropriate or how they should be
applied.
When striking down the zoning restriction, the Cleburne Court explained:
"Because in our view the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing
that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate
interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as
applied in this case.' ' 153 Yet according to the Lofton court, when the rational basis
test is used, the state has no obligation to produce any evidence to sustain the
rationality of its classification, and the burden is on the one attacking the statute
to disprove every conceivable supporting basis.'4 The fact that there was no
evidence in the Cleburne record establishing that the home in question posed a
special risk to the city's legitimate interests would not establish the illegitimacy of
the regulation in light of the test described by the Lofton court. Thus, were the
deferential rational basis test being used, the fact that the Cleburne Court could
not discern the basis for distinguishing between the groups requiring a permit and
those not requiring one would hardly establish the unconstitutionality of the
regulation.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 442.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 444.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818.
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The point here is not that Cleburnewas wrongly decided but merely that the
Lofton reading of it is implausible. Even were it true that the "purported
justifications for the ordinance made no sense in light of how it treated other
groups similarly situated,, 155 that would hardly establish the unconstitutionality 1of56
the regulation in light of the rational basis test described by the Lofton Court.
Indeed, Justice Marshall noted in Cleburne that "Cleburne's ordinance is
invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry
associated with heightened scrutiny.' 5 7 Justice Marshall was not insisting that the
relevant standard was heightened scrutiny. He pointed out that "the Court does
not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and perhaps the method employed
must hereafter be called 'second order' rational-basis review rather than
'heightened scrutiny." '158 However, Justice Marshall made quite clear that
whether called heightened scrutiny, second-order rational basis review or
heightened rational basis review, "the rational basis test invoked today is most
assuredly not the rational-basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,

Inc,"159 i.e., the deferential rational basis test. Even if the Eleventh Circuit had
used the heightened rational basis test' 6° from Romer, the court would presumably
have reached a different result.
D.

The Justificationsfor the Statute

The Lofton court explained why it believed the Florida statute passes
constitutional muster, apparently accepting some of the reasons offered by the
state, e.g., that "the statute is rationally related to Florida's interest in furthering
the best interests of adopted children by placing them in families with married
mothers and fathers,' ' 6' and that "[s]uch homes, Florida asserts, provide the
stability that marriage affords and the presence of both male and female authority
figures, which it considers critical to optimal childhood development and
socialization.' ' 162 Apparently, Florida had emphasized the "vital role that dualgender parenting plays in shaping sexual and gender identity and in providing
heterosexual role modeling,"' 63 and further had "argu[ed] that disallowing
adoption into homosexual households, which are necessarily motherless or
fatherless and lack the stability that comes with marriage, is a rational means of
furthering Florida's interest in promoting adopting by marital families."' 6

155. Id. at 821.
156. See supra nn. 139-41 and accompanying text.
157. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (0' Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that Romer involves
heightened rational basis review).
161. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 818-19.
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The state's explanation would have been more plausible had it restricted
16
adoption to married couples. However, Florida law permits singles to adopt.

By permitting such adoptions, the state undercuts its commitment to (1) providing
the stability that marriage allegedly affords,' 66 (2) assuring that there be dualgender parenting, or even (3) avoiding homes which may be fatherless or
motherless.
The court did not seem to understand that the credibility of the state's claims
was undermined by its policy of permitting singles to adopt. The court seemed
satisfied by the claim that "heterosexual singles have a markedly greater

probability of eventually establishing a married household and, thus, providing
their adopted children with a stable, dual-gender parenting environment.' ' 67 Yet
it was implausible to believe that the state really cared about the marital prospects

of the would-be adoptive parent. For example, the state made no inquiries about
current or long-term plans to marry.' 68 Further, not only might adopting a child
make it much less likely that a single individual would eventually marry,

69

but

some single individuals might have a very low probability of remarrying whether
or not they adopt a child, and they nonetheless would not be precluded by law

from adopting. Finally, even if a single would-be adoptive parent were not only
interested in marrying but fortunate enough to find someone that she/he wanted
to marry who also wanted to marry him/her, that marriage might not occur until
well after the opportunity for role-modeling had passed.

Studies suggest that children are better served by having two parents rather
than one, whether those parents are of the same-sex or of different sexes."7
Further, studies also suggest that children raised by same-sex parents are
thriving. 17' The Lofton court understood that there was empirical data suggesting
that the vital roles played by different-sex couples are played as well by same-sex

couples, 72 but dismissed that evidence by suggesting that the Florida legislature
could choose not to believe those studies if it so chose. 1' 3 The Lofton court also
underplayed those studies suggesting that children living with same-sex couples do

165. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1290-91 (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)
("Florida's adoption statute expressly provides for single persons to adopt.").
166. See id. at 1298 (noting that "it is not marriage that guarantees a stable, caring environment for
children but the character of the individual caregiver").
167. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 822.
168. See Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1297 (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
169. See id. at 1298 ("[E]xperience leads one to believe that single heterosexuals who adopt are less
likely to marry in the future, not more likely.").
170. See Mary L. Bonauto, Civil Marriageas a Locus of Civil Rights Struggles, 30 Human Rights Q.
3, 7 (Summer 2003) ("[Clhild rearing experts in the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological Association ... point to thirty-five years of
studies showing that children of gay and lesbian parents are normal and healthy on every measure of
child development.").
171. Id.
172. See Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective, 9 Va. J. Soc.
Policy & L. 291, 321 (2001) (noting that "all of the evidence shows that children raised by gay parents
develop just as well as children raised by heterosexual couples").
173. 358 F.3d at 826.
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better than children living with single parents,
the court's analysis would not be altered.175

7

suggesting that even if that is so

Florida has an overabundance of children in need of adoption.

116

The Lofton

court reasoned that "the legislature could rationally act on the theory that not
placing adoptees in homosexual households increases the probability that these
children eventually will be placed with married-couple families, thus furthering
the state's goal of optimal placement.,

177

Yet such a policy virtually assures that

some of these children will never be adopted, a result which simply cannot be
viewed as promoting their interests. It is thus especially disappointing that the
Florida policy is allegedly designed to promote the best interests of those very
children whom Florida is assuring will never be adopted and will instead remain
within the Florida system, which has received national attention for the harms that
children in its care have received. 78 It is difficult to believe that either the court or
the state has the best interests of Florida's children at heart.
E.

The JustificationsExamined in Light of the Statute

Even if the Florida statute were designed to assure that children would have
dual-gendered parenting, it would not be credible to believe that Florida would be
putting the best interests of its children above all else. Too many children would

thereby be deprived of loving families. The statute is not designed to promote the
aims described by the court and thus the court should have recognized that the
statute is irrational even under its own analysis.
The Florida statute does not preclude those with a same-sex orientation
from adopting. 79 For example, a gay or lesbian individual would not be
prohibited by law from adopting as long as that individual had been celibate for

the past year.

Even were there evidence that those with a different-sex

orientation could somehow be better role models for children,' 80 that would hardly

174. See June Carbone, Has the Gender Divide Become Unbridgeable? The Implications for Social
Equality, 5 J. Gender, Race & Just. 31, 61 (2001) (discussing the "'mountain of data' [indicating] that
children are better off with two parents than one").
175. 358 F.3d at 822.
176. See id. at 823.
177. Id.
178. See e.g. Deborah Sharp, Florida Cases Symbolize Meltdown of Child Welfare; Suits in a Dozen
States Allege Trauma, Abuse, USA Today A18 (June 14, 2002) (discussing the story of a Florida boy
who died as a result of a failure of Florida's system).
179. See Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1291 (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
180. But see id. at 1298 (revealing that no explanation is offered "why it is rational to believe that
homosexuals, as a class, are unable to provide stable homes and appropriate role models for children").
The Lofton court accepted without argument that gay or lesbian parents are less able to "provide
adopted children with education and guidance relative to their sexual development throughout
pubescence and adolescence." See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 822. Yet LGBT individuals would also
understand what it is like, for example, to be strongly attracted to someone and would be able to relate
to their children with respect to those issues. Further, many LGBT individuals discover their
orientation later in life and would be aware of what it was like to be attracted to someone of a different
sex during adolescence (as if that were the most important thing that a person could teach his or her
child). In any event, this consideration does not really seem to be as important to the state as it is
purported to be, since the state does nothing, for example, to make sure that would-be adoptive
parents have the allegedly essential experience.
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justify only prohibiting adoptions by those who had been sexually active over the
past year with a same-sex partner. Indeed, it seems clear that the Lofton court
forgot what the statute it was upholding said. The court wrote: "For our present
purposes, it is sufficient that these considerations provide a reasonably
conceivable rationale for Florida to preclude all homosexuals, but not all
heterosexual singles, from adopting."' 81' Given that the statute does not do what
the court described, one might justly wonder what the Lofton court's purposes
were.
Rather than target orientation, the statute targets same-sex activity or,
perhaps, those in same-sex relationships. This cannot be thought to promote good
public policy. Given the data suggesting that two parents are better than one
whether the parents are of the same sex or different sexes, 82 it hardly promotes
the interests of children to prevent adoptions by individuals with a same-sex
orientation who are members of same-sex couples but not by individuals who, for
example, are celibate and not coupled with anyone. The state should be focusing
on finding would-be adoptive parents, whether single or coupled, who can provide
loving and nurturing homes for children in need rather than on spiting its own
children so that it can give effect to irrational biases.
The Lawrence Court noted: "Equality of treatment and the due process right
to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty
are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both
interests."' 83 The Court suggested that one of the reasons that the same-sex
conduct is protected is that when "sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal
bond that is more enduring."' ' 4 Indeed, some commentators read the Lawrence
relations are protected precisely because of their
Court to be saying that same-sex
8
role in same-sex relationships.1 1
Here, Florida is either targeting protected conduct, namely, same-sex
relations, or same-sex relationships. In either event, the state is burdening
something protected by the United States Constitution. Regardless of whether
Lawrence is read to be protecting same-sex relations or same-sex relationships,
Lofton cannot stand. A statute which precludes only those who engage in samesex relations from adopting cannot pass constitutional muster, given the lack of a
connection between such a criterion and the welfare of children.

181. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 822.
182. See Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage: Two
Are Better than One, 2001 U. 11.L. Rev. 1, 52 ("Although children are doubtless better off living in
households with two parents, the empirical evidence does not suggest that one parent must be a man
and the other a woman for children to flourish.").
183. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
184. Id. at 567.
185. See Tribe, supra n. 118, at 1904 (suggesting that same-sex relations are protected precisely
because of their role in relationships).
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CONCLUSION

The Florida statute prohibiting adoption by those who have had voluntary
same-sex relations over the past year violates both equal protection and due
process guarantees. It is not rationally connected to the welfare of children, the
state's purported interest. Instead, it sacrifices the interests of children to give
effect to biases held by the Florida Legislature and, presumably, some Floridians.
Given the lack of a connection between the best interests of children and
whether voluntary same-sex relations had taken place over the past year, the
statute should have been struck down years ago. Yet given its incompatibility with
Lawrence, the Florida adoption ban is even more clearly unconstitutional now.
Indeed, the Lofton court might as well have issued a direct challenge to the U.S.
Supreme Court either to stand by its Lawrence decision or to repudiate it.
Regrettably, the Court chose not to hear the Lofton appeal, perhaps waiting
until the circuits had had more of a chance to consider Lawrence. This was a great
mistake. Not only might states now be more tempted to follow Florida's lead,
thereby causing even more children to be parentless, but the Court's own
credibility and prestige have been harmed. One cannot make sense of Lawrence if
the statute at issue in Lofton passes constitutional muster and the Court has now
extended an invitation to states to pass the kind of legislation which the Lawrence
Court warned would not be tolerated. As Justice Scalia has warned in a different
context, "this is no way to run a legal system. '86 One can only hope that the
Court will grant certiorari in the next Lofton-like appeal so that it can correct the
mistaken analysis and prevent even greater harm from occurring.

186. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1230 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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